Over the past 20 years, numerous research projects and surveillance studies have led to the recognition that bacterial meningitis, sepsis, and pneumonia are common and severe causes of childhood illness and death in developing countries [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] . With recent advances in vaccine development and increases in financing, most of these serious bacterial infections are preventable [6, 7] . Expanded access to appropriate antibiotics for effective case management makes those infections largely treatable as well [8] .
In 2003, however, many developing countries lacked accurate, sensitive surveillance systems to monitor the occurrence of bacterial meningitis, sepsis, and pneumonia. Information about this occurrence is important for guidance in the selection of antibiotics for therapy, which may vary in different settings according to antimicrobial susceptibility patterns and because the leading causes of bacterial meningitis and pneumonia, such as Streptococcus pneumoniae and Neisseria meningitides, have many serotypes and serogroups, but available vaccines protect against only a subset of these strains. There are many potential reasons why surveillance systems for invasive bacterial disease are uncommon in developing countries, but certainly the costs and complexity associated with them have been common barriers. In many developing countries, HIV infection affects the epidemiology of pneumococcal and Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib) disease. HIV infection is known to increase the risk of invasive bacterial disease and, in the case of pneumococcal disease, to influence serotype distributions. As such, comparisons of invasive bacterial disease rates between sites or across time within the same site require information on HIV seroprevalence in the population and among case patients. Without this information, it is difficult to draw inferences about factors other than HIV that might explain variations in incidence rates.
This supplement reports a recent major initiative to strengthen and expand surveillance of bacterial meningitis and pneumonia in developing countries. Since 2003, this surveillance initiative-sponsored by the GAVI Alliance's Pneumococcal Vaccines Accelerated Development and Introduction Plan (PneumoADIP) of Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health and the Hib Initiative and implemented in collaboration with the World Health Organization-aimed to expand the number of sites that perform surveillance and to enhance the quality and promote the comparability of the data collected. These reports come almost 2 decades after the Board on Science and Technology for International Development studies-a large, major, multinational effort to generate etiological data in developing countries-were reported elsewhere [9] .
The surveillance undertaken varied by site. Some sites focused purely on meningitis, whereas others focused on pneumonia. Some sites were able to implement population-based surveillance, whereas others relied on hospital sentinel surveillance. Laboratory methods also varied, depending on the local availability The result is a collection of information that will help developing countries and global agencies to make better decisions and to develop realistic expectations about what surveillance will and will not deliver. The surveillance projects summarized here included 15 countries in resource-constrained regions of the world, 191,000 blood specimens and 34,000 CSF specimens collected and processed during the course of 4 years, and an investment of 1$9.5 million. This represents a major increase over recent history, in terms of the quantity of data and the diversity of settings included in the project.
The surveillance projects used standardized case definitions, reporting methods, and analysis criteria. This represents a major improvement over many of the projects that came before. The experience with this level of standardization is instructive. The standardization efforts greatly improved the ability to compare data among sites. However, these comparisons also help to illustrate a considerable degree of inherent variability in the types of patients at the various settings. Most notably, the data show that the severity of pneumonia among patients, with use of the same standard definition, varied considerably across sites, sometimes even within the same country or city. In this sense, it validates the efforts to establish standard definitions and reporting criteria and, at the same time, highlights that the standard definitions used, especially for pneumonia, are not sufficient to ensure that surveillance detects only patients with the same severity of disease at all sites. As one of us (M.D.K.) put it, "We thought our standardization would give us a basket of apples so that we could compare apples to apples. Instead, it showed us that what we had was a fruit basket." Fortunately, it is a well-described fruit basket.
Because of the differences in scope and methodology, sideby-side comparisons of results are usually not possible. An overview of the range of results observed across sites in presented in table 2. (This overview includes information only from sites that contributed у30 pneumococcal isolates.) In short, although it improved what preceded it, the experience with standardization also illustrates how much further we can and must go to develop surveillance systems that will support the kinds of epidemiological inferences that we hope to draw from the data.
The results presented in this supplement point the way forward and provide the basis for a surveillance "plan of action" that would greatly strengthen the quality and consistency of surveillance of bacterial invasive disease worldwide. We cannot afford to let another 2 decades elapse before new data are generated. The availability of new bacterial vaccines requires that surveillance be sustained, to monitor their impact on disease. The list of next steps must start with the establishment of a set of robust, evidence-based surveillance indicators. Sev- eral putative indicators are available in World Health Organization documents, but these must be strengthened and become the accepted minimum for surveillance practice. In their absence, we run the risk of drawing conclusions about differences in the epidemiology of invasive bacterial disease that reflect artifactual, not actual, differences. Second, we must continue to use standard case definitions and reporting methods. Third, reporting systems that include individual patient-level data and that provide timely feedback need to be established. Much of the residual variability in surveillance observed in the articles in this supplement could be understood if the sites had reported individual patient data rather than tables of aggregated data. There are also lessons to learn from the design and conduct of the surveillance that are worthwhile to consider. First, the surveillance reported herein was largely conducted through "networks" of sites. These networks included annual meetings at which representatives from sites shared data and experiences. In several instances, this process led to "peer pressure" put on poorer-performing sites to improve their quality of surveillance and promoted the sharing of best practices across sites. Through the sharing of data across networks and observation of the comparisons presented, the level of "minimum acceptable" surveillance was raised to a level that was not previously seen. Second, the process of building this surveillance developed capacity in many countries that did not exist previously. Third, the projects often increased collaborations between government officials and independent research institutions. In the process, the quality of the surveillance met high standards, and the involvement of both parties meant that national decision makers had access to the data and support for its interpretation.
By 2015, we can realistically expect that most of the world's poorest countries will be using Hib and pneumococcal conjugate vaccines and that many of those countries, especially in the African meningitis belt, will be using meningococcal conjugate vaccines. In this light, surveillance of bacterial pneumonia and meningitis will continue to be important in the years to come. The experiences reported in this supplement will have made lasting contributions to the prevention of these diseases and to the conduct of surveillance in the countries and regions studied. It is our sincere hope that these efforts will continue and that the many individuals, teams, and organizations who dedicated themselves to surveillance over the past 5 years will continue to play important roles in the years ahead.
